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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




THE NTA~rE TAX CO~Il\IISSION o:F' 
UTAH, 
Defendaut. 
Case No. 8192 
APPELLANT''S REPLY BRIEF 
ON WRIT OF' CERTIORARI 
from 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION ·OF U'TAI-I 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I. 
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDA-
TION, INC., IS EXEMPT AS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED 
AND OPERATED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES AND 
THEREFORE IS NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE CORPORA'TION FRAN·CHISE TAX ACT. 
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It is asserted by the defendant in its Brief that the 
:Jierrill Farnily F·ounda tion, Inc. does not corn ply \vith 
that portion of the exeu1ption statute \\~hich reads as fol-
lo\vs: 
"* * * no part of the net earnings of which 
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual." 
It is sub1nitted that the record in this case shows that an 
individual can receive absolutely no benefit by the mere 
fact that he is a stockholder or an individual interested 
in the l\ferrill Family F'oundation. As pointed out in our 
original Brief membership in the Foundation carries with 
it absolutely no right or chance of benefit. !1:emhership, 
in and of itself, grants no rights or privileges or pecuni-
ary gain to any person. While it is true that a member 
rnay qualify for a loan, his membership in the Founda-
tion is not a requirement therefor. A person may contri-
bute to the Community Chest or the Boy Scouts, and he 
may in turn receive aid from these organizations, not be-
cause he was a member or contributed but because of his 
need. Such is the exact situation with the Merrill Family 
Fnunda.tion. This type of situation does not deprive the 
fund of its exemp·tion. 
In C. C.H. Federal Tax Reporter, Section 656.04, is 
found the following: 
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"A1nerican Legion. The fact that son1e of 
the Inembers may be beneficiaries under a fund 
for disabled veterans and their orphans does. not 
deprive such fund of exeinption. I.T. 2139, I\T-1 
C.B. 38." 
C.C.H. Federal Tax R.eporter, Section 660.04, is as 
follows: 
"By-laws of a country club that, on dissolu-
tion, life members shall receive the assets after 
debts are paid and before any sums are paid to 
regular Inembers or shareholders, does. not deny 
exemption. S.M. 958, 1 C.B. 202." 
Fro1n the above and fro1n the organizational records 
in this case it would appea.r clear that there is no benefit 
to any private shareholder or individual of the Merrill 
Family F·oundation in the sense set out in the statute. 
The priluary requisite in this regard is that th-ese cor-
porations shall not operate for private profit. This is the 
exact case 'vith the Merrill Family F!oundation. 
POINT II. 
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDA-
TION, INC., IS NOT A SMALL LOAN CORPORATION OR-
GANIZED FOR PROFIT. 
If 've follow the trend of thought of the defendant, 
apparently defendant classifies the Merrill Family 
Foundation as a small loan corporation organized for 
profit and "predicated upon the commercial formula of 
investing capital and realizing the ultimate return there-
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of together \Yith the incre1uent of interest." Even a 
casual glance at the organization of the Merrill Fa1nily 
Foundation \vould be convincing that it is not a loaning 
institution. An organization to aid students to obtain 
a college education by making available to the1n funds 
by way of loans is a well recognized educational benefit. 
In the case of Amy Hutchison Crellin v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B. T .A. 1152, quoted in our original Brief, we 
find the following: 
The Crellin F:oundation was set up for two purposes, 
the second of "\Vhich was listed in subdivision B, consist-
ing of loans or gifts to you!lg n1embers of a designated 
church. Four applications by church members were ap-
proved and loans made to them. On page 1155 of the 
opinion of the Board, the Board of Tax Appeals held: 
''If the trust had designated as beneficiaries 
only those stated in subdivision B, the statutory 
exemption would hardly be doubtful. Such a trust 
would he a means of providing for education, with-
out personal specification or identification, of the 
young p~eople of a church of the community, and 
this would be enough to establish the charitable 
character of the trust. In re Henderson's Estate, 
112 Pac. (2d) 605; In re Willey's Estate, 128 Ca. 
1; 60 Pac. 471." 
See also Emerit E. Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 
B.T.A. 555, cited in appellant's original Brief on pages 
20 and 23. 
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POINT III. 
THE METHOD OF FINANCING EDUCATION BY THE 
MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC., 
BRINGS IT UNDER THE EDUCA'TIONAL EXEMPTION 
OF THE CORPORA~TION FRANCHISE TAX ACT. 
Under Point III of defendant's argu1nent it is as-
serted that this F'oundation does not qualify under the 
educational exemption for the reason that it does not 
participate and engage in education as such. In other 
\Vords, the defendant would restrict the Ineaning of this 
statute to such a degree that only schools actually giving 
instruction would qualify. It is submitted that the defi-
nitions and cases in this regard do not bear out defend-
ant's contention. In this respect we call further atten-
tion to the case cited above of Amy Hutchison Crellin 
and also Emerit E. Baker. 
In addition to the cases cited in appellant's original 
Brief, showing that the beneficiaries are not so restricted 
as to disqualify the Foundation for exemption, we call 
the Court's attention to Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 
98 F. 2d 706. The syllabus in this case is as follows: 
"A special aid association, organized to per-
form and performing exclusively acts of charity 
by giving relief from funds collected thereby to 
indigent and deserving persons designated by 
board of managers, was 'charitable association,' 
gifts to which by individuals were deductible in 
computing their taxable income, though all bene-
ficiarie-s designated by board were personally 
known to members of association. Revenue Act of 
1932, sec. 23n(2), 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 23 note." 
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And on page 707 the Court says: 
"It is true that the beneficiaries who ·w·ere 
actually designated by the Board of Managers 
were all personally kno'vn to one or more mem-
bers of the Associati~on and were p·eople who might 
perhaps have been given aid by one or more of 
then1 had the Association not been in existence 
but that does not change the character of the 
As-sociation itself. That was as extensive in chari-
table scope within the ranks of the indigent and 
deserving public as it means and the discretion 
of its Board of Managers might make it. Its acti-
vities vvere exclusively charitable within the statu-
tory n1eaning of that term. Harrison v. Barker 
Annuity F'und, 7 Cir., 90 F. 2d 286, 289; Gimbel 
v. Commissioner, 3 Cir. 54 F. ·2d 780; Bok v. 
McCaughn, 3 ·Cir., 42 F. 2d 616. And they were 
all of the kind it was organized to conduct as 
shown hy the articles of as·sociation and within 
the limitations of its c'onstitution. Having been 
organized to perform exclusively acts of charity 
and having performed such acts and no others, 
this Association in form and fact was a. charitable 
association of the kind named in Sec. 23 ( n) ( 2) 
of the R.evenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 23 
note. It had no net earnings so far as appears 
and certainly no part of them, if it had any, inured 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividual having a personal and private interest 
in the activities of the Association. See, T. R. 77; 
Art. 527. Consequently gifts made by individuals 
to the Ass·ociation within the taxable year were 
deductible in computing the net inco1ne of the peti-
tioner." 
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The above discussion is, of course, to be read in con-
junction with appellant's original Brief in setting out 
the position that the ~[arriner W. :J1errill Fa1nily Foun-
dation, Inc. meets each and every test imposed by the 
exe1nption statute. 
Respectfully subtni tted, 
~1ERRILL & MER.RILL 
Attorneys at La.w 
Residence: Pocatello, Idaho 
ELIAS L. DAY 
Attorney at Law 
Residence: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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